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Abstract
Code obfuscation makes it harder for a security analyst
to understand the malicious payload of a program. In most
cases an analyst needs to study the program at the machine
code level, with little or no extra information available,
apart from his experience. An unexperienced analyst is con-
fronted with a steep learning curve, as understanding un-
obfuscated machine code already requires some skills. We
have built LOCO, a graphical, interactive environment to
help a security analyst improving his skills in understand-
ing obfuscated code.
1. Introduction
Code obfuscation can serve two goals. On the one hand,
it can be applied to protect a company's technology from
being copied. On the other hand, obfuscation can be used
to hide malicious code in a program. For example, an ex-
ploit to hack a Debian server was obfuscated, to make it
difcult for a security analyst to nd the malicious code 1.
In this demonstration we present Loco; a tool to speed up
the learning process of a security analyst to understand ob-
fuscated code. The tool can apply a series of obfuscation
transformations to a program, after which it shows a graph-
ical presentation of the obfuscated program. A security an-
alyst can make use of well-known analyses such as domina-
tor analysis, liveness analysis and other predened analyses
included in the tool to help him deobfuscate the code.
LOCO is an extension of the graphical user interface
LANCET[8], combined with an obfuscation infrastructure
in the underlying link-time program rewriter DIABLO[4]2,
which allows us to do ne-grained code obfuscation[7].
LOCO is freely available from the DIABLO website.
The remainder of this tool presentation is organized as
1http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/12/02/hackers used unpatched server/
2http://www.elis.ugent.be/diablo
follows. Section 2 presents the underlying structure of
LOCO, one obfuscation transformation and the running ex-
ample. Section 3 describes the deobfuscation features. Sec-
tion 4 gives a brief overview of the demo. In Section 5 we
discuss the limitations of our tool and give directions for
future work. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 Obfuscation transformations
DIABLO is a multi-platform link-time binary rewriting
framework from which we will use the x86 backend and
ELF object le format. LANCET, a graphical user interface
on top of Diablo, can visualize the call graph of a program
and control ow graphs (CFGs) of the procedures and lets
a user easily navigate through them. Furthermore, LANCET
provides means to edit the graphs. LOCO not only consists
of a library with obfuscation transformations, but contains
also features for deobfuscation.
Figure 1. Control flow flattening
The insertion of opaque predicates [3] and the flatten-
ing of the control flow graph [9] are the most known ob-
fuscation transformations. An opaque predicate such as
∀x, y ∈ Z : 7y2 − 1 6= x2 [1] exploits a property which is
known at obfuscation time, but that is hard to derive after-
wards. Insertion of such predicate introduces new (seem-
ingly executable) paths through the program that have the
Figure 2. The obfuscated procedure kill some processes with additional screens to make it easier for a
security analyst to deobfuscate the code.
purpose to mislead the attacker. Another obfuscation trans-
formation which changes the control ow of the program is
control ow attening. It is the most popular control ow
obfuscation technique and is rst described by Wang [9].
As can be seen in Figure1, a CFG is transformed such that
all basic blocks of a procedure appear to have the same set
of predecessors and successors. This obfuscation technique
is the key technology in an industrial obfuscation tool by
Cloakware Inc.[2]. This technique was developed to be ap-
plied on Java programs, but can easily be applied on an
x86 program. Control ow attening is also used for wa-
termarking [11] and tamper resistance [10].
Using a simple example, we will show how LOCO helps
a security analyst in understanding obfuscated code. We
will obfuscate a simple piece of code containing a mali-
cious content; killing some processes. The assembly code
generated for the source code shown below is rather easy to
understand.
int kill_some_processes(int i)
{
for (;i<=0x12345;i++)
kill(i,9);
}
Obfuscating this code with the standard control ow at-
tening makes it less comprehensive. The obfuscated x86
assembly code can be seen in Figure 2. A security analyst
could try to understand the obfuscated code as such, or he
could rst try to simplify the code. For this simplication
he can use some features of LOCO to assist him. In the next
section, we discuss those features.
3 Deobfuscation infrastructure
There are two difculties in analyzing an obfuscated pro-
gram: creating a CFG representation of the code and ex-
tracting the functionality of the code. In our case, we only
focus on the latter and assume that the analyst has been able
to build, at least partially, a CFG of the program under study.
In the case of LOCO, all the necessary information is
available to allow the analyst to modify the CFG, without
the need to take care of adapting address calculations or lin-
earizing the CFG. As such, an analyst can create an exe-
cutable version of the code at every moment and test if the
transformations applied so far are semantics-preserving.
Transformations in LOCO can be applied manually or au-
tomatically. In a basic block, instructions can be inserted,
deleted, moved or changed. Sometimes, changing instruc-
tions will change the control ow as well, so LOCO allows
a user to modify the control ow by adding, removing or
retargeting edges. In case there are obvious side effects of
some actions, the side effects can be applied automatically,
like e.g. removing a fallthrough path when a jump instruc-
tion is made unconditional.
Manual inspection of the code could be a good starting
point for the deobfuscation process. Starting from the en-
try basic block of a function, a security analyst could dig
into the code to reveal superuous paths, inefcient code or
malicious content. A function has a certain structure and
suspicious paths will be detected much faster after gaining
some experience. For example, it is very uncommon that
the entry basic block of a function does not start with the
two instructions: push %ebp and mov %esp,%ebp, which is
the case in our obfuscated example in Figure 2.
LOCO helps the security analyst by providing useful in-
formation about the program internals. In the current tool,
the security analyst has liveness analysis, constant propaga-
tion and dominator analysis at his disposal to extract infor-
mation from the control ow graph. In our case e.g. a dis-
patcher variable3 is used for control ow attening. Con-
stant propagation could help the analyst nding the value of
the dispatcher variable when some path in the CFG is taken.
Editing the CFG by changing edges and instructions in
a basic block can make other instructions become superu-
ous. An analyst can reuse analysis and optimizations orig-
3a variable that is used as an offset in a switch table that will steer the
control flow
inally developed for program compaction to automatically
remove (part of) this superuous code. Examples of this are
dead code removal, branch forwarding, unreachable code
removal etc.
During the deobfuscation process, a security analyst
might experience some shortcomings in the available analy-
ses and deobfuscation transformations or nd himself repet-
itively applying the same set of transformations by hand.
In this case, the security analyst can implement his newly
found transformation into the LOCO framework to further
automate the deobfuscation process.
Besides support for deobfuscation, LOCO can point an
analyst to the interesting parts of the program under study.
A program can contain a lot of functions, which are mostly
not relevant for the analyst. Using some predened metrics,
the procedures in a program can be sorted by their degree
of suspicion. These metrics can be e.g. the absence of a
procedure prologue or epilogue, overwriting the return ad-
dress, etc. As such, an analyst can nd the obscure parts of
a program more efciently.
4 Demo
In the demo, we will start from an obfuscated procedure,
as shown in Figure 2 and deobfuscate it. During the deob-
fuscation process we will make use of manual graph modi-
cations and instruction edits. Constant propagation will be
used to nd the value of the dispatcher variable (although
this is trivial in this oversimplied example). Using dead
code removal, the resulting code will be cleaned. In this
example we will end up with several superuous stack op-
erations. We will explain how an analyst can add his own
transformation to automate the removal of such instruction
sequences.
After the deobfuscation, the result is compared with the
original procedure. We will then show how this code has
been obfuscated using the built-in obfuscation transforma-
tions in LOCO. We will also show the provided functional-
ity to scan a program for suspicious code fragments.
5 Limitations and Future Work
LOCO is developed as an experimental environment to
help a security analyst in understanding obfuscated code
and is not yet able to deobfuscate or reverse engineer real-
world malicious software such as obfuscated viruses. The
infrastructure currently assumes the existence of a control
ow graph derived from the malicious program. Disassem-
bling an obfuscated malicious program and deriving a con-
trol ow graph from it is not in the scope of this paper, al-
though we are currently working on this. We are developing
a new frontend which will produce rst of all a disassembly
from an obfuscated binary, based on the novel binary anal-
ysis technique proposed by Kruegel et al. [5]. Afterwards,
a control ow graph will be derived from the disassembled
instructions. The resulting CFG might be overly conserva-
tive and contain a lot of unrealizable paths. However, even
with extra information available, it is nearly impossible to
construct the most accurate CFG. More details on the con-
struction of a CFG without information external to the bi-
nary can be found in Madou et al. [6].
We think that LOCO is an ideal tool to develop new
(de)obfuscation transformations and we think that it can be
easily extended to be applicable for other (de)obfuscation
scenarios. The tool is the rst and currently the only x86
(de)obfuscator and is free to use and modify. This enables
other security analysts to extend the tool with their own
analysis and transformations.
6 Conclusion
We will demonstrate LOCO, a graphical, interactive,
easy-to-use experimental environment to help a security an-
alyst in understanding obfuscated code. With LOCO it is
possible to interactively deobfuscate a program using un-
derlying analysis. The program modications during de-
obfuscation can be tested on correctness by producing an
executable version of the code and verifying the function-
ality. LOCO reduces the learning effort for unexperienced
program analysts and is a good experimentation platform to
test obfuscation and deobfuscation techniques.
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